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The PrimiTive mind of SilaS Marner
by anna neill
in a chapter of Phantoms in the Brain, v. S. ramachandran puts one 
of the yet unsolved mysteries of neuroscience back into the context of 
a two-century-old debate about religiosity, creativity, and evolution.1 
having described how electrical storms in the limbic system provoke 
emotional charges that might be experienced as religious rapture, he 
then looks at a case history in which mystical experience coincided 
with an extraordinary expansion of memory to speculate on the pos-
sibility of a neural correlation between spiritual transcendence and 
certain savant phenomena. Such miracles of the mind, he proposes, 
should be interpreted within an evolutionary framework that can ex-
plain the development of compensatory mechanisms and specialized 
talents. he concludes, however, with an observation about creative 
genius, pointing out that this represents expanded areas of general 
intelligence, rather than extraordinary, isolated acts of mental bril-
liance. The source of this intense creative activity remains as obscure 
to scientists in the twenty-first century as it did to Charles darwin’s 
colleague, alfred russell Wallace, who attributed it finally to God. in 
an odd way, the uncertainty of ramachandran’s closing remarks is in 
keeping with the broad intellectual contours of victorian debate about 
evolution. ramachandran’s surrendering of scientific ground to the 
unknown, heightened by a tip-of-the-hat to William Shakespeare and 
the mystery of his unrivaled gift for metaphor, implicitly invites other 
disciplinary modes of investigation, including art and literary criticism, 
to help make sense of some of the most obscure and extraordinary 
products of the mind.
ramachandran’s cluster of speculations about mysticism, creativity, 
and scientific knowledge revisits victorian discussion not just of the 
physiological substrate of mental life and the substitution of evolution-
ary biology for divine intervention but also of the relationship of the 
known to the unknown. having praised the “clearness and honesty” 
of darwin’s The Origin of Species, George eliot went on to say that 
“development theory and all other explanations of processes by which 
things came to be, produce a feeble impression compared with the 
mystery that lies under the processes.”2 What sounds uncharacteristi-
elH 75 (2008) 939–962 © 2008 by The Johns hopkins University Press
940 The Primitive Mind of Silas marner
cally mystical probably expresses a passion for the unknown as it is 
navigated by the imagination, much like the capacity for “mental vi-
sion” that George henry lewes identifies in his literary criticism as the 
source of both scientific aptitude and artistic greatness. Such vision, for 
lewes, originates in the general capacity of mind to transform sense 
perceptions, via the agency of inference, reasoning, and imagination, 
into knowledge about that which lies beyond the senses.3 in science, 
this projection moves across much greater distances than ordinary 
inference can travel. The artist’s exceptional strength of mind, on the 
other hand, reveals itself in his or her power to gather the “numerous 
relations of things present to the mind” and form images beyond the 
promptings of sense impressions while nonetheless remaining true to 
the originating force of these impressions.4 hence, both scientific and 
aesthetic vision represent superior knowledge and powerful imagina-
tion so as to supply “the energy of sense where sense cannot reach.”5 
intuition and foresight, understood as the capacity of great artists and 
exact scientists to see beyond immediate relations and to reason beyond 
local experience, are a vital part of coming to know and communicate 
things as they really are. The at once intuitive and intellectual work 
of the exceptional mind, in other words, is essential to the accurate 
representation of reality.
This perhaps explains how George eliot is able to incorporate 
prophecy and other forms of spiritual vision into the realist fabric of 
her novels. although her narrators are sometimes skeptical of their 
more spiritually-oriented characters, the narrative voice seldom directly 
condemns expressions of spiritual rapture, and in Daniel Deronda 
prophecy or second sight is actually a feature of the narrative archi-
tecture, as the “manifold openings” with which the narrator accounts 
for the power of prophetic vision mimic the narrative recognition of 
manifold relations among characters and events that lewes identifies 
as the property of an exceptional mind.6 however, Silas Marner, a very 
different kind of novel, might be read as a story about the problem of 
representing a consciousness with little-to-no capacity for imaginative 
reach and where the unknown shapes and dominates nearly all cognitive 
events. not only the cataleptic Silas but indeed all the characters that 
belong to his world are limited to the “perpetual, urgent, companion-
ship of their own griefs and discontents,” and “the ever trodden round 
of their own petty history[ies].”7 a mind that encounters the world 
through such a narrow window will, as eliot describes it elsewhere, 
“exalt feeling above intellect” and will have, in religious life especially, 
a “sense of truthfulness [that] is misty and confused.”8 The problem, 
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then, is how to bring together the primitive subject matter of the 
novel—the darkened regions of consciousness—with the exceptional 
narrative intuition and intellect that can illuminate narrow mental and 
social landscapes, and perhaps, in so doing, discover dynamism and 
complexity in a world that has all but lost them.
Silas Marner, eliot wrote to her publisher, was “a story which 
came across my other plans by a sudden inspiration.”9 This acknowl-
edgment of a debt to the mysterious workings of the creative mind 
might be said to find its negative imprint in the strange vacuity of 
mind that characterizes catalepsy—the condition afflicting the novel’s 
central character. in what seems, at least provisionally, like a formal 
endorsement of the miraculous/vacuous dyad, the plot of the novel is 
driven by the sudden, inexplicable appearances and disappearances of 
people as well as precious objects. These are mysteries whose natural 
cause is only sometimes apparent to the narrator and a few skeptical 
characters on the periphery of the narrative. Thus, even though this 
narrative describes social life in thoroughly organic terms, its very 
structure respects the force of the mystical. The novel, that is to say, 
reflects the operation of what eliot’s narrator identifies as a primitive 
mental state, in which “vagueness and mystery” (S, 9) or simply a 
“fearful blank” deliver incomplete or fantastic meaning (S, 22). eliot 
argued that artistic form is high or low depending, like the form of 
an organism, on the level of complexity of parts that are bound into 
an “indissoluble whole.”10 The narrative’s focus on the retreat of an 
extremely complex organism—a human being—to its most primitive 
structure, suggests precisely the reverse process. Such organic and 
narrative dissolution, as it takes place pathologically and figuratively 
in catalepsy, is a withdrawal of the mind into the unknown.
Silas’s catalepsy seems to befuddle both narrative realism and 
medical science. We are offered no rational explanation for the attacks 
that render him as incapable of psychological as of physical move-
ment. The possibility that they are the result of divine inspiration, 
however, is immediately removed by Silas’s honest testimony that he 
had no vision from God; indeed, there was no mental content to the 
episodes whatsoever. The story apparently sides neither with scientific 
enlightenment nor with Protestant awakening. instead, it provides a 
bare-bones depiction of a sudden, inexplicable suspension of the in-
ner life, “a mysterious rigidity and suspension of consciousness” (S, 9) 
that only the rudest-minded of its characters interpret as signifying 
either divine or demonic influence. We cannot credit these primitive 
interpreters—neither the fiercely judgmental members of the isolated 
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lantern yard community nor the benignly superstitious raveloe 
villagers—with any special knowledge of the condition. and yet with 
no Tertius lydgate in the novel to speculate on the minute behavior 
of nervous pathways and so begin to explain this strange condition 
of emotional and physiological arrest, it is hard to see how catalepsy 
can have any currency in the narrative economies of psychological 
and social realism either. in eliot’s other novels, it is the growth and 
flexibility of minds as well as the subtle interactions among them that 
brings the subjective state into relationship with its larger environ-
ments, creating new social possibilities through what the narrator of 
Middlemarch calls “unhistoric acts.”11 Silas Marner, on the other hand, 
puts the blank mind of catalepsy at the heart of a world unchangingly 
shaped by tradition, superstition, and the tendency to describe that 
which is unknown as “dark to the last” (S, 169).
i. aCCoUnTinG for CaTalePSy: naTUralizinG The 
SUPernaTUral
The absence of medical commentary on Silas’s condition is perhaps 
especially striking given how long trance phenomena have featured 
in the dialogue between faith and science. both in Catholic mysti-
cism and in Protestant revivalism, the death-like trance testifies to a 
direct intuitional experience of God where the soul is so absorbed in 
the divine that it fails to animate the body. for Protestant reformers, 
catalepsy, along with epileptic seizures, speaking in tongues, trance, 
visions, and clairvoyance, signified the “indwelling” or “witness” of the 
Spirit, as eighteenth-century Protestant evangelists characterized it. 
numerous eighteenth- and nineteenth-century published accounts, 
particularly in the United States, of deep trance or apparent death 
in which the subject was shown the horrors of hell and the glories of 
heaven provided textual support for this experience of Spirit. in Mem-
oirs of the reverend William Tennent, for example, an apparently dead 
man revived after several days, and reported that in what seemed like 
a much briefer period of “unspeakable rapture,” he found himself “in 
another state of existence, under the direction of a superior being.”12 
in the account given of her experience during a five-hour trance, 
Sarah alley recalled that she was led by a heavenly guide to see the 
burning lake and then to heaven, where she saw Christ surrounded by 
angels. in another episode, she was commanded by Christ to return to 
the world and teach sinners to repent.13 a poem called The Prodigal 
Daughter depicts a young woman guilty of swearing, whoring, Sabbath 
breaking, and attempted murder who falls into a swoon from which 
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she apparently cannot be revived, and only a cry from her coffin frees 
her from the fate of being buried alive. When she is restored to life, 
she reports on the flight her soul took through heaven and hell, and 
she is restored to grace and repentance.14 in each of these episodes, 
the cataleptic attack marks the moment of spiritual transformation as 
that in which the mind withdraws from its physical environment and 
finds union with God.
Such testimonies to immediate religious experience were sup-
posed to contrast with the spiritual lethargy of high Church formal-
ism. They were challenged, however, by naturalizing discourses that 
identified ecstatic states as symptoms of physiological disorder. from 
richard burton’s anatomy of Melancholy (1620), which interpreted 
such states as symptoms of religious melancholy, to scientific skepti-
cism about animal magnetism and the trance medium in the 1850s, 
medical philosophy and later physiological psychology endeavored to 
naturalize religious experience and to strip trance phenomena of their 
supernatural content. even within the revivalist movements themselves, 
such phenomena might be explained naturalistically, if only to point 
more indirectly to the presence of Spirit. ann Taves has shown that 
moderate reformists like Jonathan edwards, John Wesley, George 
Whitefield, and James robe drew upon the naturalistic explanations 
made by anti-enthusiasts in order to distinguish true religious experi-
ence from its enthusiastic counterfeit.15 along with scientific skepti-
cism and religious naturalism, some revivalist movements themselves 
advocated a measured interpretation of spiritual ecstasies. rapture, 
in itself, was no guarantee of divine influence. it might be merely a 
symptom of physiological disorders or a naturally enhanced state of 
mind. John Wesley, for instance, cautioned that the Witness of the 
Spirit should be complemented by the fruits of experience.16 Prophetic 
episodes, this suggested, might well signify divine inspiration but they 
were also indicative of a condition of mind physiologically triggered by 
the saturation of consciousness with an idea of transcendence. Spiri-
tual experience, however genuine it may or may not be, as an early 
twentieth-century historian of spirituality put it, should nonetheless 
be described as an “abrupt seizure” which “temporarily disorganizes 
and may permanently injure the nervous system of the self.”17
Such skepticism about the influence of supernatural forces on the 
body apparently point to the grand story of the arrival of modern 
secular consciousness: the disenchantment of the world that gradually 
took place in europe from the seventeenth century on, only stub-
bornly resisted by the counter-enlightenment enthusiasm of Protestant 
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radicals and spiritualists who refuse to recognize that all phenomena 
are finally reducible to nature’s laws. This somewhat cartoonish de-
scription of opposing sides in a multi-century culture war has been 
helpfully complicated, however, by several recent cultural histories 
of magic and the marvelous. in their account of the emergence of an 
“anti-marvelous,” lorraine daston and Katherine Park describe the 
subjection of wonders and miracles to natural-scientific and political 
discipline in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. in part, they 
argue, this was achieved by a “collapse of the art-nature opposition 
in the study of nature” in francis bacon, rené descartes, and their 
followers.18 in different ways, these early figures of enlightenment 
appropriated the culture of wonder for the wonders of nature, thus 
extending the territories of natural history and philosophy into those 
of magic and miracle, rather than simply discarding the latter as so 
much rubble from the ruins of a pre-modern worldview. along similar 
lines, Simon during has shown that the idea of modernity, evacu-
ated of enchantment, and banishing spirituality to the physiology of 
the inner life, is itself a construct for the modern project of creating 
and shaping interiorized subjects.19 With these cautions in mind, the 
naturalization of trance phenomena might be interpreted not simply 
as a feature of the scientific-positivist march into enlightenment but 
more subtly as investigating an interstice between the known and the 
unknown. in studies of cataleptic trance, the unknown might then be 
deployed in conjunction with the known to illuminate the recesses of 
the primitive mind. 
The relationship between natural and supernatural explanations for 
the visions and insights that often accompany trance states receives 
what is probably its first thorough exploration in meric Casaubon’s 
a Treatise Concerning enthusiasme (1655). Casaubon suggests that 
natural causes can be identified for ecstatic experience without deny-
ing the truth and reality of supernatural influences or their possible 
manifestation in the prophetic content of that experience.20 yet he 
distinguishes the sudden alienation of mind and the strange raptures 
it provokes from the “true divination,” and the “highest gift of God . . . 
[in] sound reason” (T, 62). God’s immediate presence is less prob-
ably felt in the strange phenomena generated by most varieties of 
enthusiasm than in that “sound reason and discerning spirit [that] is 
a perpetual kind of divination” (T, 63). hence the likely explanation 
for the former lies in those natural causes, ordinary or extraordinary, 
which remain obscure to us. We can conjecture, however, that “[m]any 
natural things, by some natural foregoing signes, may be known, felt or 
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discerned by [such] men or creatures, that have a natural disposition 
or sympathy, whether constant or temporary, to those things or their 
signes, though unknown unto others that have not they be altogether 
unknown” (T, 55–56). Casaubon argues that ecstatic prophecy, in its 
natural form, is of the same class of phenomena as the sensitivity of 
animals who can anticipate storms well in advance of the human senses. 
Prophecy can be attributed to the power of an exaggerated natural 
sense, or sympathy. in this way, apparently supernatural phenomena 
are subjected to both known and unknown natural laws, which are in 
turn of God’s making.
Casaubon identified enthusiastic “divinatory fits” as “incidental” to 
the natural diseases of, among others, melancholy, mania, and hyste-
ria (T, 36). Such conditions, however, render the patients especially 
vulnerable to demonic possession, and natural causes are “not wholly 
sufficient to produce this effect” (T, 42). nearly two centuries later, 
robert macnish’s Philosophy of Sleep identifies almost exactly the 
same physiological origins for divinatory trance, adding that medical 
science has not be able to fully account for all manifestations of trance 
phenomena:
The remote causes of trance are hidden in much obscurity; and generally 
we are unable to trace the affection to any external circumstance. it has 
been known to follow a fit of terror. Sometimes it ensues after hysteria, 
epilepsy, or other spasmodic diseases. . . . nervous and hypochondriac 
patients are the most subject of its attacks; but sometimes it occurs 
when there is no disposition of the kind, and when the person is in a 
state of the most seeming good health.21
The possibility of malign supernatural influence that Casaubon con-
cedes is replaced not by an understanding of the physiological origins 
of trance but by a gap in medical knowledge—a cause unknown. Since, 
with the symptoms of catalepsy, the apparently suspended activity of 
the heart and lungs during the trance must be “more apparent than 
real,” continuing to support life at a level below that which our senses 
can detect, the causes of such trance cannot be uncovered by current 
technologies of observation.22 in keeping with the larger theme of his 
study, macnish does suggest that the clairvoyant content of some trance 
experiences might be attributed to the same mental cause as that of 
apparently prophetic dreams. if the mind is not in a state of torpor, 
as it usually is during a trance, it might be in a condition analogous to 
the state of dreaming, and thus call up memories of impressions that 
the conscious mind has long-since forgotten. yet most of the accounts 
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of catalepsy—stories of people who apparently return to life moments 
before burial, or of others who can fall into a trance at will—while 
they might be related to prior conditions, like hysteria, remain for the 
most part “astonishing and inexplicable.”23
in his Observations on Trance or Human Hibernation (1850), James 
braid is more ambitious than macnish about discovering the natural 
origins of suspended animation. he recommends that scientific men 
suspend their skepticism about the extraordinary accounts of the fa-
kirs who survive voluntary burial for days or weeks, and rather than 
dismissing such accounts as fraudulent, instead “endeavour to arrive at 
a satisfactory solution of the phenomena on physiological principles.”24 
like both Casaubon and macnish, braid suggests that catalepsy is 
linked to hysteria, and thus that it can be brought about by shock or 
terror as well as by religious enthusiasm. more specifically, however, 
and in the interests of distancing his own practice of hypnotizing his 
patients from the occult strains of mesmerism, he suggests that by a 
combination of suppressed respiration and the fixing of the mind on 
a single object, the human body can reduce all its vital functions to 
the same condition of those of hibernating animals. “The unfortunate 
extravagance of the mesmerists,” who claim gifts of clairvoyance, thus 
making “a mockery of the human understanding and all the known 
laws of physical science” has compromised that genuine study of the 
remarkable phenomena of trance, one of whose pathological manifesta-
tions is catalepsy.25 The “wonderful exaltation of the natural faculties” 
that can occur in the trance state—the suspension of vital activity, the 
remarkable heightening of memory, the extreme vividness of imagina-
tion, and even the intensification of reasoning power—are “only exag-
gerations or exaltations of functions or faculties which are possessed 
by all of us in a less degree in the ordinary or waking condition.”26 
Such states and the phenomena that sometimes accompany them are 
particularly likely to be triggered by powerful religious experiences, 
as in the case of the hindu fakirs, because the subject is so isolated 
from the external world and so intensely concentrated on the internal 
world that the senses barely respond to external stimuli.
braid insists that “unlimited skepticism” about the remarkable 
instances of human hibernation is as “equally the child of imbecility 
as implicit credulity.”27 neither superstitious nor narrow-mindedly 
skeptical, science should make incomplete knowledge about the hu-
man mind and body valid to the investigation and treatment of disease. 
yet the problem remains of what exactly to do with phenomena that 
remain so far outside the orbit of current medical knowledge that, if 
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they do not point to the influence of the supernatural, they do seem to 
highlight science’s feeble grasp of the operations of nature. even as late 
as 1896, in an account of some instances of premature burial, we are 
told that “of all the various forms of suspended animation, trance and 
catalepsy” are described as “the least understood . . . ; the laws which 
control them . . . appear to be as insoluble as those which govern life 
itself.”28 The radical differences of opinion over modern instances of 
catalepsy even within medical academies, these authors go on to say, 
“are sufficient to show that all the culture and the scientific instincts 
of the present age have not quite inaugurated the ‘reign of law’ nor 
established finally that ‘miracles do not happen.’”29 
This argument might be seen less to authenticate religious experi-
ence at the expense of scientific inquiry than to gesture to the skeptical 
core of evolutionary science itself. our interpretation of nature, our 
imposition of laws upon all its vagaries, William benjamin Carpenter 
insists, must in turn be understood in terms of the “mental processes, 
by which are formed those fundamental conceptions of matter and 
force, cause and effect, law and order.”30 These conceptions are rep-
resentations framed by the mind, and as such they are formed out of 
a combination of the impressions made upon the senses by external 
objects and common-sense views that are “the generalized experiences 
of the human race.”31 Such cultural banking of knowledge is what 
enables inquiry to proceed beyond the gathering of empirical data. 
Common sense, “one of our most valuable instruments of scientific 
inquiry; affording in many instances the best, and sometimes the only, 
basis for a rational conclusion,” is thus an instrument of progressive 
evolution: “The intellectual intuitions of any one generation are the 
embodied experiences of the previous race.”32 by this reasoning, cata-
lepsy will be understood by a future generation of educated men who 
are able to grasp the as yet impenetrable natural laws that encompass 
its strange manifestations. at present, it is accessible to science only 
through the agency of an “uncommon sense.”33 Citing braid’s study 
of the fakirs, Carpenter observes that those who have some medical 
knowledge of self-hypnosis, or of the experiments that have been con-
ducted on mammals underwater, or of how an organism might survive 
in the soil temperature of certain regions of india, can observe how 
braid’s hindu devotees surrender voluntarily to a death-like torpor 
and survival burial for days or weeks on end without either offending 
that acquired intuition that refuses to believe such a feat is possible, 
or resorting to supernatural explanation.34
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yet even as scientific method, “that trained and organized common 
sense” is transforming the basis of belief in religious inquiry, substitut-
ing the evolutionary principle of continuity for supernatural cataclysms 
and interruptions, Carpenter’s psychology points out that the mind can 
tend to self-deception. Under the influence of a mental prepossession, 
a subject may actually produce sensations, as the higher mental states 
exercise a downward influence on the sensorium. The prepossessed 
mind thus “dwells on its own imaginings” producing hallucinations and 
revelations, which, as long as the common sense is suspended, seem 
unquestionably real. Contemporary testimony to the supernatural 
phenomena of table-turning and other miracles of the séance as well 
as the ancient faith in dreams, visions and trances can be attributed 
to this tendency of the mind to prepossession or “ideational states.” 
even the mind of the scientific observer, he suggests, is vulnerable to 
the seduction of its own idolatrous prejudices: “We are liable to be 
affected by our prepossessions at every stage of our mental activity 
from our primary reception of impressions from without to the highest 
exercise of our reasoning powers.”35 
Carpenter’s warning resembles bacon’s: that we should be wary 
of the idols of the mind both in the objects and in the subject of 
scientific inquiry. if the physical structure of the brain evolves under 
the guidance of common sense, this suggests, then it is difficult not 
to conclude that it might come under the equally powerful influence 
of ancestral idols; it might, in other words, become more primitive 
rather than more scientific. This possibility in turn suspends the con-
jectural history that puts nomadic societies at one end of the human 
evolutionary chain and european civilization at the other, and suggests 
that the primitive is a condition of mind whose features appear in the 
very evolutionary pathways that should overcome them. This deracial-
izing of the savage invokes herbert Spencer’s theory of dissolution as 
natural tendency reversing that of evolution. for Spencer, evolution 
consists of the movement of systems into increasing specialization, 
stabilization, and heterogeneity. its counter-tendency is to be found 
in dissolution, which tends toward homogenization, instability, and 
disintegration (illustrated, for example, in the death of organisms, the 
breakup of complex molecules, and the disintegration of societies under 
the pressure of social unrest).36 Put in the context of mental science, 
the theory of dissolution pulls the figure of the primitive out of the 
remote past and into the present tense of scientific modernity. 
dissolution might therefore have the power to bring the primitive 
characters and the modern narrator of Silas Marner into the same 
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temporal and mental orbit, thus threatening the integrity of realist 
narrative itself. We have already seen how, in resisting natural, as 
well as supernatural, explanations for catalepsy, the novel refuses to 
elevate science over spirit. it is therefore not quite “a secular fable 
demythologizing . . . puritan allegory,” as one critic has suggested.37 
rather, Silas Marner might be said to confound all modes of interpreta-
tion through the agency of mental dissolution as Silas’s mind becomes 
entirely disconnected from the surrounding world. in the pathology of 
catalepsy, the organism retreats to its most primitive condition as only 
the automatic elements of the nervous system are able to function, 
enabling just the minimal interaction with the environment necessary 
to immediate survival. This evacuation of mind, including the functions 
of memory, thought, and will, from the physical body results in a state 
of social as well as physiological arrest, since there are no longer any 
available channels of sympathy through which human subjects can 
interact. Unable to penetrate Silas’s consciousness, the narrator can-
not bring subjective and social realities into sympathetic dialogue and 
her characters are correspondingly incapable of the kind of emotional 
growth achieved by a dorothea or a Gwendolyn.
There is, of course, some such growth in the novel. The raveloe 
community becomes kinder and more accepting, in step with the 
emotional development of its central characters: an outsider becomes 
gradually more open to his neighbors and a self-absorbed member of 
the gentry learns to appreciate how his decisions impact the emotional 
lives of all those around him. on the other hand, the village characters 
are never reformed in their belief in the agency of the supernatural; 
their faith that Silas’s condition consists of a marvelous wandering of 
the soul from the body is paired at the end of the story with their 
confidence that his “strange history” is infused with “blessing” (S, 171). 
Silas assumes he has witnessed a miracle when his lost gold apparently 
returns in the form of a little girl. even when the thief is discovered 
and the gold restored, he attributes its reappearance to a “wonderful” 
(S, 157) divine agency. each instance demonstrates the kind of per-
ceptual error that, in Daniel Deronda, eliot attributes to an ignorance 
of evolutionary principles or “the true bond between events and false 
conceit of means whereby sequences may be compelled—like that 
falsity of eyesight which overlooks the gradations of distance, seeing 
that which is afar off as if it were within a step or a grasp” (D, 194). 
The narrator of Silas Marner, who remains steadily skeptical of miracles, 
does not commit this error. She understands and brings to narrative 
light the multitude of psychological and circumstantial events that 
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deliver eppie to Silas’s door, as well as the power of sympathetic love 
to restore an all but dead man to active social life. yet she has no 
explanation for Silas’s catalepsy that can substitute for that of divine 
or satanic agency. Whatever it is that causes Silas’s catalepsy remains 
a mystery, and that mystery is as arresting of narrative realism as it is 
of physical and mental activity.
ii. CaTalePSy and The failUre of SymPaThy 
for eliot, the creation and interpretation of true relations between 
things is linked to the biological and moral functions of sympathy. her 
essay “notes on form in art” argues that poetic form is not a fixed 
frame for holding emotional content but an organic response to the 
emotional rhythms as they adjust to the conditions of their environ-
ment. This organic sympathy “by which no part can suffer increase or 
diminution without a participation of all the other parts in the effect 
produced and a consequent modification of the organism as a whole” 
expresses the darwinian principles of variety and selection, although 
the latter is artistic rather than natural selection. The highest and most 
complex forms are those that demonstrate “the most varied relations 
within a wholeness which again has the most varied relations with all 
other phenomena,” and from which the artist discriminates tones, 
rhythms, and sequences that best match the human passions she seeks 
to represent.38 This act of discrimination is the discovery of a differ-
ence, the identification of a particular object or part while continuing 
to respect that object’s intrinsic and extrinsic relations with other 
bodies. in place of the anti-scientific and preposterous dualism that 
eliot ridicules in her essay on “Silly novels by lady novelists,” which 
declares that the gifted lady artist can see more in the “soul of man” 
than merely an evolved polypus, she substitutes the dynamic force of 
form-as-difference.39 The truer forms of fiction reflect the most subtle 
variations in the highest form of organism, in which the interactive 
force of sympathy creates continual modifications of the whole.
Thus, apart from the “divine beauty of [exceptional] form” the nar-
rator of adam Bede declares, there is “that other beauty too, which lies 
in no secret of proportion, but in the secret of deep human sympathy” 
with its “faithful representing of commonplace things.”40 Taking her 
inspiration from the subjects of dutch realist art, the narrator who 
aspires to represent this commonplace world “should have a fibre of 
sympathy connecting [her] with that vulgar citizen who weighs out 
[her] sugar in a vilely assorted cravat and waistcoat,” with the “common 
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labourer” and the “perhaps too corpulent” clergyman of her own par-
ish.41 The narrator’s attention to the “monotonous homely existence” of 
ordinary, local lives is faithful because both she and they belong to the 
same social totality whose future rests on the manifold relationships 
and minute transformations that characterize organic life in general.42 
despite the novel’s tenderness towards its methodist heroine, dinah, 
this sympathy, whose active agency can bring narrator and characters 
into the same evolving social orbit, contrasts with a revealed religion 
whose passive voice separates world, mind, and soul from a remote 
agent of change: “i felt a great movement in my soul, and i trembled as 
if i was shaken by a strong spirit entering into my weak body. and . . . 
i spoke the words that were given to me abundantly. . . . and many 
wept over their sins and have since been joined to the lord.”43
Silas Marner describes a human being who is forced to live without 
either the nourishing influence of sympathy or any more autocratic 
guide. Unlike dinah, Silas is not called away by God to village life 
from the intensely isolated religious community of lantern yard, but 
rather banished from the latter by the apparent evidence of God’s 
disfavor. once his fellow members, directed by the deceitful William 
dane, interpret his cataleptic attacks as a “visitation of Satan” rather 
than a sign of God’s favor, Silas loses what little capacity he had for 
independent thought and spontaneous sympathy (S, 11). his “old 
narrow pathway” (S, 17) of thought is unable to distinguish human 
passions from divine action, so that instead of blaming dane for his 
misfortunes, or objecting to the archaic system of drawing lots as an 
instrument of justice, or speculating more generally that the forms 
of religion might be manipulated to human advantage, he loses trust 
in both God and man and blames an “unpropitious deity” even as he 
withdraws from society altogether (S, 16). Unable to sever religious 
form from feeling by “an act of reflection” (S, 13) he is as empty of 
the evolved capacities for reason and independent judgment as the 
“spinning insect” whose unquestioning life his resembles (S, 17). The 
primitive condition of his mind before his exile, shaped as it was by 
the primitive life of an isolated community, is now further reduced to 
“utter bewilderment” (S, 17).
Silas’s cataleptic attacks bear no particular relationship to this change. 
They are apparently as frequent at lantern yard as they are at raveloe, 
and so they cannot be identified as a natural consequence of increased 
isolation any more than they can be attributed to supernatural agency. 
The effect of this almost complete severance of sympathetic attach-
ment to any other living being does however create another kind of 
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de-animation, as solitude makes Silas increasingly less like a human 
being and more like a thing. his “face and figure shrank and bent 
themselves into a constant mechanical relation to the objects of his 
life, so that he produced the same sort of impression as a handle or 
a crooked tube, which has no meaning standing apart” (S, 20). What 
seems like fetishism is in fact reduction to an even more primitive 
state: to the non-organic thing itself. in the love of objects, on the 
other hand, the fetishistic investing of them with animate qualities, he 
shows “that the sap of affection was not all gone” (S, 20). he sees in 
the favorite pot that he breaks “an expression of willing helpfulness” 
(S, 20) and in the coins that he is yet to earn “the unborn children” 
that he longs for (S, 21). yet excepting these expressions of primitive 
feeling, Silas is at the very lowest place in the hierarchy of sensibilities 
that the novel sets up, from “the subtle and varied pains” (S, 29) of 
the highly cultured, to the simple egotistic preoccupations of ruder 
minds, to the “unresenting” dog who will bear its masters blows be-
cause it sees no alternative, to the unquestioning insect, and finally 
to the inanimate object itself (S, 31). once his human affection is 
reduced to its smallest dimensions in fetishism, he becomes himself 
de-animated and his gold “gather[s] his power of loving together into 
a hard isolation like its own” (S, 40).
This metaphorical link to catalepsy is perhaps the closest we get to 
an explanation of the latter’s strange manifestations. The almost total 
arrest of the nervous system and the reduction of mental activity to 
the point that even the breath is barely detectible is like the way that 
isolation and the disappearance of the affections cause the organism to 
shrivel into something that is barely alive. at the level of plot, however, 
the narrative fails to provide an adequate source for the attacks. The 
grown eppie continues to be on the watch in case “one of her father’s 
strange attacks should come on,” the only clue being that emotional 
strain may be a precipitating factor (S, 169). other than providing 
William dane with an opportunity to betray Silas at the beginning of 
the novel, the attacks do little to advance the story, which could easily 
substitute Silas’s near-sightedness as the cause of his obliviousness to 
eppie’s arrival. if, on the other hand, Silas’s catalepsy is a physiologi-
cal metaphor for arrested social growth, then the mental dissolution 
that characterizes it has leaked into narrative as another kind of de-
animation. Catalepsy is not, in this case, an organic metaphor; it is not 
a figure that expresses the dynamic relationship between psychological 
and social phenomena. The cataleptic trance does not appear to have 
any formal relationship to those conditions of mind and social states 
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shaped either by compassion, in the case of Silas’s integration into the 
raveloe community, or by moral cowardice, as in the case of Cass. 
The best function it can serve in the novel is in the much older liter-
ary mode of allegory. yet allegory is what elsewhere the novel gently 
dismisses along with revealed religion, as the narrator observes that it is 
only in the “old days [that] there were angels who came and took men 
by the hand and led them away from the city of destruction” (S, 123). 
The novel is no more a Pilgrim’s Progress for modern times than it is 
a positivist account of the origins of unusual mental or spiritual phe-
nomena. Using eliot’s own criteria for aesthetic judgment, it might be 
said that this story about catalepsy is itself barely a living thing. 
iii. evolUTion, ProPheCy, and TranCe
Catalepsy thus represents the same anomaly for realist narrative 
that it does for medical science. This is particularly striking given 
the naturalization of miracle and mystery that the novel otherwise 
achieves. even in the opening paragraph, we anticipate an intellectual 
gap between narrator and characters as we learn the story is to be set 
in “old times” and in a world limited to the contrast between direct 
experience and “a region of vagueness and mystery” (S, 5). The fairy-
tale frame could not be more different from the opening narrative 
plunge into the complex psychologies of Daniel Deronda, where the 
question “was she beautiful or not beautiful?” (D, 3), with all that it 
suggests about the relationship of form to the activity of the mind, 
belongs both to daniel and to the narrator. in Silas Marner, on the 
other hand, the narrator knows what most of the characters do not: 
namely that natural causes can be assigned to extraordinary events. 
She knows that Silas’s confusion of eppie’s hair with the lost gold 
is an effect of his lingering mental bent towards the objects of his 
miserly passion, and that the miraculous transformation of inanimate 
object into living child is only the effect of a mind so disinherited 
from reason that it “confus[es] thought and feeling” (S, 116). and she 
sides with the skeptical farrier, who refuses to accept the existence of 
ghostly phenomena, as she ironically describes the apparition of Silas 
at the rainbow. in addition, spectral phenomena are psychologically 
naturalized in Godfrey, as the sudden appearance of Silas and eppie 
at the red house, again described as an “apparition from the dead” 
(S, 108), to the audience of dancers who witness it becomes for 
Godfrey “an apparition from that hidden life which lies, like a dark 
by-street, behind the goodly ornamented façade” (S, 108). Godfrey’s 
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willed forgetting and Silas’s involuntary disconnection from his past 
provide discoverable psychological causes for the apparent mysteries 
in the raveloe world. however much the causes of strange events may 
be dark to the characters, the property of the mind’s vagueness and 
mystery, to the narrator they can be explained in terms of the greater 
laws that need not be interrupted by miracle, for they demonstrate 
the “orderly sequence by which the seed brings forth a crop after its 
own kind” (S, 70). 
 The obscure etiology and opaque narrative meaning of catalepsy 
is also remarkable when one considers how trance states and their 
clairvoyant contents are represented in Daniel Deronda. in that 
novel, the gift of second sight is given, if not a physiological, then an 
evolutionary-psychological explanation, when the narrator suggests 
that there may be those “whose natures have manifold openings . . . 
where there may be a greater and more miscellaneous inrush than 
through a narrow beadle-watched portal.” This abundance of sensible 
impressions feeds the “seed-like growth” of “yearnings, conceptions . . . 
[and] conclusions” that then express themselves in the coercive form 
of the vision. Such a predisposition to intuitive knowledge cannot be 
understood apart from evolutionary forces, since it is itself a feature 
of what the narrator calls “inevitable kinship,” and greater and lesser 
forms of the visionary can be found just as greater and lesser forms 
of mammalian life are bound together by evolutionary ties or “great 
mental or social types” are related to “specimens whose insignificance 
is both ugly and noxious” (D, 404). mordecai’s spiritual loneliness, 
unlike Silas’s, drives his yearning to transmit the spiritual contents 
of his mind to some younger kindred soul. his “expectant faith in a 
prophecy” (D, 405) is not just the spiritual equivalent of a belief in 
the evolutionary progress of the racial type but the very fusion of the 
two in a nationalist vision of the man who will lead his people to the 
homeland:
Tracing reasons in [him]self for the rebuffs he has met with and the 
hindrances that beset him, he imagined a man who would have all 
the elements necessary for sympathy with him, but in an embodiment 
unlike his own: he must be a Jew, intellectually cultured, morally 
fervid—in all this a nature ready to be plenished from mordecai’s; 
but his face and frame must be beautiful and strong, he must have 
been used to all the refinements of social life his voice must flow with 
a full and easy current, his circumstances must be free from sordid 
need: he must glorify the possibilities of the Jew, not sit and wander 
as mordecai did. (D, 405)
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mordecai is a perpetrator as well as a victim of cultural stereotyping 
if not of a eugenicist fantasy wherein the “noble types of the hu-
man form” promise to reinvigorate the race with pride and heroism 
(D, 405). inevitably, in the combined contexts of race and national 
destiny, eliot’s evolutionism takes on this troublesome meaning. at 
the same time, she is able to unite evolutionary biology with national 
prophecy as the vision of a miraculous restoration to Judea comes into 
contact with the principle of continuity and transformation through 
descent.44 hence the passion that mordecai expresses is both like but 
also “something more than a grandiose transfiguration of . . . parental 
love” (D, 455). meanwhile, deronda’s own search for his biological 
and cultural parentage, accompanied by feelings of dread in the first 
half of the novel, is increasingly infused with “dreamy constructions” 
of his ancestry once first mirah and then mordecai come to be central 
in his life (D, 532). The final book but one of the novel, “The mother 
and Son,” opens with a quotation from part 1 of robert browning’s 
Paracelsus, which contextualizes the reunion of biological mother 
and child, and daniel’s subsequent discovery of his Jewish identity in 
the spirit of messianic revelation discovered through trance: “if some 
mortal, born too soon / Were laid away in some great trance . . . / . . . 
till dawned his true time’s advent . . . ” (D, 529). 
mordecai himself is thrown into a cataleptic fit by the force of his 
spirit. at the club of The Philosophers, the only public place where 
he is comfortable since its familiarity enables him to resist the pres-
sures of the outer world that “narrow the inner vision,” he gives free 
rein to his enthusiastic spirit (D, 444). here, even as he argues with 
his skeptical fellow Jews about tradition, prophecy, and racial destiny, 
he becomes less and less aware of what is immediately around him, 
until finally his chin sinks on his breast and he is unable to respond 
to the pleasantries and farewells of the other men. he becomes “rapt 
and motionless” (D, 460). both his gift of prophecy and his tendency 
to become insensible to his surroundings are doubled, or perhaps 
inverted, in the narrower mind of Gwendolyn, who is susceptible to 
“fits of spiritual dread,” experiencing any events that compromise her 
mastery over her environment as so terrifying that she is immobilized 
by them (D, 52). When her performance as the awakening statue of 
hermione is interrupted by the accidental opening of a moving panel 
upon which appears a “dead face [and] fleeing figure” (D, 49), Gwen-
dolyn continues to look like a statue, but one now “into which a soul of 
fear had entered: her pallid lips were parted; her eyes, usually narrowed 
under their long lashes, were dilated and fixed” (D, 49). Such trance-
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like moments of physiological arrest and psychological withdrawal 
from the immediate environment, which Gwendolyn thinks back on 
as “a brief remembered madness,” temporarily check her arrogance, 
ambition and contempt for those around her as she becomes frozen 
in horrified premonition (D, 51). later in the novel, these cataleptic 
states become charged with Protestant revelation. Convinced that she 
is responsible for Grandcourt’s death, Gwendolyn confesses to deronda 
a terrible ecstatic awakening to her own sin, declaring “it was not my 
own knowledge, it was God’s that had entered into me” (D, 593) and 
that “[i]t was all like a writing of fire within me” (D, 596). 
yet it is not through submission to the spirit alone that Gwendolyn 
is humbled. having always been afraid of anything that presented an 
“existence aloof” (D, 52) from her own petty ambitions, she experiences 
the discovery of deronda’s mission to the east as a shrinking of her 
own life before the enormity of national destinies and their gradual 
shaping through “the slow urgency of growing generations” (D, 689). 
at this moment, Gwendolyn’s still-egotistic assumption that confession 
of her sin will somehow bind deronda to her is overwhelmed as the 
evolutionary destiny of the species enters her consciousness. This is 
the “sort of crisis,” the narrator tells us, in which apocalyptic vision, a 
“rolling, fiery visitation,” takes form as “something else than a private 
consolation” (D, 689). for Gwendolyn, as for mordecai, the private 
spiritual ecstasy that arrests all other activity in the mind is tied to 
the evolutionary energy whose indifference to the individual ego is as 
dreadful to her as it is inspiring to deronda. The narrative voice itself, 
linking single histories to one another and to the larger evolutionary 
story of the human mind’s overcoming of selfish passions, inhabits both 
the minor divinatory and the fully clairvoyant states that both inflict 
and enlarge the minds of its major characters. This is the voice that 
can describe the evolution of second sight, that links poetic fervor with 
“a mind . . . which thrills from the near to the distant, and back again 
from the distant to the near,” and that can both discern the way its 
characters experience dread in relation to the unknown and anticipate 
how they will grow in their efforts to embrace it (D, 175). in addition 
to present-tense omniscience, in other words, it supplies the voice 
and vision of evolution and prophecy. it manifests the strength of the 
superior mind that lewes identified in the capacity to intuit beyond 
the local, the immediate, and the sensible.
in Daniel Deronda, then, the temporary arrest of the faculties can 
be seen as a physiological expression of this reconciliation of vision-
ary and evolutionary expression. The mental and formal dissolution 
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in Silas Marner, on the other hand, points to loss of historical con-
sciousness, a confidence that “the world’s the same as it used to be,” 
and the assigning of difference to the dark and unknown (S, 171). We 
have seen that the ordering consciousness of the narrative does not 
penetrate the mind of the cataleptic Silas or record in his character 
what richard menke, describing how lewes’s physiological psychology 
influences eliot’s prose, has described as “the hidden flows and pulses 
of the body . . . [and] subtle possibilities of feeling.”45 yet it is not just 
that psychological narrative balks at the anomaly of catalepsy and its 
dissolving of the interior state. for indeed there are no characters 
representing “the subtle and varied pains springing from the higher 
sensibility that accompanies higher culture” (S, 29). instead, the nar-
rator describes “ruder minds,” condemned to absorption in their own 
private suffering (S, 29). among these characters, even those who ex-
perience remorse do not do so with Gwendolyn’s intensity. nor do they 
experience, as she does, a sudden awareness of an evolving universe of 
events indifferent to her needs and the resulting near-destruction of the 
organizing relationship of self to world. Godfrey Cass is so dulled by 
the monotony of his environment that his potential for finer thoughts 
is reduced to self-absorbed reflections on his own petty history. Such 
stagnancy then seems to be reinforced by the narrator herself, who 
resists invading the “privacy of Godfrey’s bitter memory” (S, 29). To 
do this would be to dissect the fluid emotions of entrapment and guilt 
that are so important to the psychological development of characters 
like Gwendolyn or arthur donnithorne in adam Bede. 
iv. ConClUSion: SCienCe and The PrimiTive mind
Silas Marner therefore seems to consign to the unknown what 
Daniel Deronda brings into the light of evolutionary psychology. yet 
it might still be possible to find a positivist interpretation of Silas’s 
fits by employing a radical physiology—one that does not hierarchize 
mental events, like Carpenter does, from the most primitive sensa-
tions to the most sophisticated exercise of the rational will. Sally 
Shuttleworth has argued that the novel challenges the confidence 
of mid-victorian psychology in both the fundamental unity of mind 
and the reflection of this unity in social progress and cohesion.46 She 
links this recognition of mental and historical discontinuity to lewes’s 
controversial claim in The Physiology of Common life that there is 
no executive center to consciousness, and his removal of the rational 
actor from the dynamic interplay between organism and environment. 
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Continuous identity and the logic of character that depends upon it, 
Shuttleworth argues, may be frail in Silas Marner because the novel 
experiments with the possibility of liberating human physiology from 
the higher operations of the mind. by this reasoning, catalepsy could 
be classified as physiological metamorphosis, rather than mental dis-
solution. in his discussion of the relationship between life and death, 
lewes expands the territory of organic life so as to include even death, 
refusing to distinguish between the two as between a “negative and 
a positive” or “a darkness which shrouds up a light.”47 instead, he 
argues, death is the collapse of the organic unity that constitutes life, 
but a life which is in turn constituted by a little more wasting than 
repair of cellular material, and thus by a steady metamorphosis whose 
properties include decomposition and death slightly more than they 
do composition and growth. Conversely, when a whole organism is 
dead, some of its parts may remain living, as in the case of a head 
rolling on a scaffold, whose features may continue to contract. That 
“death is indissolubly linked with all that has constituted life” suggests 
that, rather than representing something beyond the laws of organic 
transformation, death signifies only that “certain forms of existence 
are completed, and certain others are commenced.”48 by analogy, the 
arrest of certain mental functions during the cataleptic state would 
point to a change in direction in the evolution of the organism rather 
than to the reversal of the evolutionary process.
 yet elsewhere for lewes, as for eliot, the distinction between 
higher and ruder minds is epistemologically crucial. in a discussion 
of the developmental conditions under which supernatural causes 
are invoked to explain the unknown, lewes uses the term “primitive 
mental state” to describe the refusal to admit scientific methodology 
into inquiry about the world, or to set aside the authority of sacred 
texts in favor of verification through experience.49 Such ignorance, he 
argues, also perpetuates an imperfect Christian ethics, since the latter 
continues to be rooted in superstition and tradition.50 in eliot’s 1855 
essay on “evangelical Teaching,” which asserts the moral dangers of 
both ecclesiastical dogma and a belief in direct inspiration, she asserts 
the hierarchy of mental processes and the alliance between intellect 
and feeling that is so central to her moral philosophy. moral behavior 
demands that the subject allow religious impulses to be guided by 
intellect rather than an enthusiastic exaltation of feeling. hence the 
“highest moral habit, the constant preference of truth, both theoretically 
and practically, pre-eminently demands the co-operation of the intel-
lect with the impulses . . . [something which] is indicated by the fact 
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that it is only found in anything like completeness in the highest class 
of minds.”51 Such moral “completeness” is analogous to the broader 
prediction lewes makes about the eventual triumph of science over 
theology and superstition: 
nowadays, among the cultivated minds of europe, it is only in the 
less-explored regions of research, where argument is made to do duty 
for observation that the supernatural and metempirical explanations 
hold their ground. When science has fairly mastered the principles of 
moral relations as it has mastered the principles of physical relations, 
all Knowledge will be incorporated in a homogenous doctrine rivaling 
that of the old theologies in its comprehensiveness, and surpassing it 
in the authority of its credentials.52
lewes’s dream of universal scientific knowledge expanding into 
all realms of human experience, moral as well as physical, relies on 
both the exhaustion of unexplored phenomena and the extinction of 
uncultivated minds. in Problems of life and Mind, this historicized 
and teleological model of knowledge is more aggressively united with 
imperialist ideology as “the intellect of the explorer distinguishes and 
classifies” where the “axe of the colonist clears the way.”53 Together 
they illuminate the ancestral landscape inhabited by the superstitious, 
idolatrous “savages and semi-cultivated nations” of the current day.54 
yet lewes’s primitive is also figured in the excessively religious or 
fanciful minds of those who fail to test the intuitions and conclusions 
that the rational and abstracting mind always generates beyond the 
data of sense perception. once more linking the work of the scientific 
observer with that of the artist and critic, he uses the example of a 
spectator at the theater who should properly recognize at once the 
idealizing nature of the play and its capacity to avoid falsifications that 
are inconsistent with that ideal. This critic figure thus recognizes that 
reality is partly reflected through and partly symbolized in the mind. 
The test of true knowledge is to verify symbolic and abstract thought 
by testing its correspondence to the presentation of feeling, which is 
all that the mind directly experiences of external reality. hence, despite 
the physical basis of mind, which exists in reality, the work of that 
mind, and the symbolic power that it must muster in order to grasp 
any piece of reality larger than the fragments delivered by the senses, 
suggests that any knowledge of it can only be acquired through the 
higher processes of the intellect and the symbolic forms it produces. 
This is also the relationship between art and reality. art promises 
access to the real, but only through a representative, not an actual, 
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world. The veracity of the representation is then tested aesthetically 
in the emotions it is capable of stimulating.55
 in Silas Marner, this higher capacity of the mind to unite thought 
and feeling has been lost. Such dissolution is manifest in the supersti-
tion of the raveloe villagers, in Silas’s catalepsy and analogous social 
withdrawal, and in Godfrey’s excessive attention to his own needs and 
subsequent suffering. “a man of genius,” lewes insists, “is one whose 
sympathies are unusually wide.” he embraces the thoughts and feel-
ings of all those around him, and out of these “greets the dawning of 
a new idea upon his soul.”56 eliot identifies genuine sympathy as an 
expression of an advanced state in which truth is discernible through 
forms that demonstrate “piety towards the present and the visible” 
rather than in “the remote, the vague, and the unknown.”57 not only 
are the characters in Silas Marner incapable of such sympathy, but the 
narrator too finds herself so intellectually remote from her subjects 
that she cannot provide them with a future true to human potential 
in the way that other parts of the story are true to human suffering. 
Gwendolyn’s reformation under the influence of the greater narratives 
she resists suggests that present and visible sympathy can be linked 
to national spiritual destiny, so making the prophetic projection into 
the unknown a journey into the known. Where there is dissolution 
rather than evolution of the organism, however, there is less to be 
seen and said. in Silas Marner, the narrator’s access to the realities 
of the present and of the future is so reduced that she is effectively 
drawn back into the primitive world from which she seemed at first 
so removed. and there she wanders through the territory of the dark 
and the unknown, where she encounters only the shrinking of human 
nature and the cavities of the dissolving mind.
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